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This conceptual paper presents a model that may be used to 
redress the power balance between retailers and suppliers 
in the supply chain through better information symmetry 
and mutual dependence. It explores power dependence and 
resource dependence theories to conceptualise the use of 
demand information, by drawing on the diverse viewpoints 
within the extant literature on the effect of supply chain power 
asymmetry on exchange relationships and mutual dependence. 
Co-optation adds stability and reduces uncertainty through the 
exchange of resources. The dynamic nature of relationships and 
power between retailers and suppliers requires a multi-theory 
approach to identify a robust understanding of the interplay 
of different influence factors. This study has both operational 
and strategic implications for the food supply chain, as power 
asymmetry in relationships affects sustainability, especially 
in sales promotions periods for both retailers and suppliers. 
Improving power equilibrium between the buyer and supplier 
through information symmetry with the integration of power 
and resource dependence theory is novel.
Consumer demand information as a re-balancing 
tool for power asymmetry between food retailers 
and suppliers
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Introduction
Power is the property of social relation and therefore lies in the dependency 
between actors. Assessment of this dependency reveals that these relationships 
are affected by control of valuable resources (Emerson, 1962). If the actors 
jointly share these resources, it will reduce the imbalance between the 
relationships. This will increase reciprocity in relations resulting in even 
distribution of rewards for all actors. However, there are different levels of 
dependencies thus requiring different balancing operations to stop relationships 
from becoming unstable in the long term (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Power asymmetry is a major subject in supply chain relationship 
management discourse (Yang et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2016; Hingley et al., 
2015; Cox & Chicksand, 2005). However, there is a lack of research agreement 
as to why and how to redress such power imbalance and to what effect 
(see Naude & Buttle, 2000 and Svensson, 2001 for typical opposing views 
on the role of power in supply chain relationships), as some consider this 
asymmetry to be an inherent part of the business transaction; whereas others 
authors have treated this power asymmetry as opportunism by retailer. 
Consideration of the extant literature reveals two dominant schools of 
thoughts as to how rebalancing power asymmetry ought to be approached 
(see Tables 1 and 2 for examples of studies that follow one or the other 
positions for their respective enquiry).
One strand of the literature posits that power dependence is a major 
cause of instability in supply chain relationships and steps must be taken to 
redress the imbalance to the advantage of the weaker party (Yang et al., 2018; 
Maglaras et al., 2015; Nyaga et al., 2013). The alternative school of thought 
is that the presence of a powerful partner adds stability with resources, and 
a weaker partner should adjust to living with the pertaining arrangement 
(Hingley et al., 2015; Cox & Chicksand, 2005). Despite the considerable 
contributions made by the key proponents of these contrasting schools of 
thought, power asymmetry between suppliers and retailers (Hingley, 2005a; 
Hingley, 2005b; Belaya & Hanf, 2009) continues to impinge on the risk 
exposure and success of supply chain stakeholders within the food industry 
(Hingley, 2005a).
Resource dependence theory suggests that power is not a zero-sum game 
and dependencies should be managed in organizations to reduce uncertainty 
and to improve autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). One possible tactic 
can be to co-opt and look for alternatives. This includes agreeing to joint 
objectives of knowledge and resource sharing. This will reduce the transaction 
costs for the organizations and also decreases the propensity to be exploited 
by power actors. Whereas power dependence theory considers relations as 
part of power sharing and its imbalances affects resource access.
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As retailers and suppliers relations and their access to the resources are 
an integral part of the food supply chain, hence these two theories plays an 
important part in explaining the interplay of these factors. Based on two 
important organizational behaviour theories (power dependence and resource 
dependence, the paper will investigate: 1) How the power of retailers (due 
to better access to the resource) affects relationship management with the 
supplier. 2) What set of conditions could prevail between suppliers and 
retailers so that the advantage gained by one partner is not at the expense 
of the other? 3) What set of tools or resources are available to suppliers 
(especially small food suppliers) to create mutual benefit (win-win situation) 
for both actors in the supply chain?
This paper contributes to the discourse around power and dependence 
by conceptualising the use of consumer information (shopper demand) 
as a critical set of tactics to be explored by food retailers and suppliers, 
especially small food supplier in the UK to redress power asymmetry with 
powerful retailers for mutual benefit. This context is important as food 
chains are more vulnerable to wastes (shorter product shelf lives) due to 
power asymmetry. The UK food industry is chosen for the focus/ exemplar 
of the paper, as it is (typically for mature developed economies) dominated 
by a small handful of big chain retailers, and these exercise considerable 
buying power over small food suppliers. Tesco is one such example, being 
the largest retailer in the UK it has access to a huge database of 1.4 million 
consumers (Malik et al., 2019). It uses insights from this to plan and 
execute sales which are targeted and sustainable. If cooption will occur the 
small food suppliers will benefit from this knowledge and a better power 
equilibrium can be achieved.
This paper argues for a reconfiguration of supplier-retailer relationships 
that facilitates mutual utilization of resources that will not only improve the 
power balance for the weaker partner but also benefit the powerful partner by 
increasing its profit in that category, and reduce the waste (both in terms of 
value and volume) along the supply chain.
This position represents an integration of the tenets of organisational 
behaviour theories (power dependence and resource dependence theory). 
Specifically, these theories explain why and how power exercised by one 
partner (due to resources and size) in a relationship of mutual dependence can 
be countered by balancing operations by a weaker partner (Emerson, 1962). 
This re-balancing of power may be achieved by better utilisation of resources, 
through increasing investment and reducing costs (Davis & Cobb, 2010; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
To address these research questions, the paper creates a conceptual 
framework by first reviews the literature on power and relationships with 
special emphasis on the retailer-supplier supply chain context. Thus, 
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highlighting gaps around the balance of power, access to resources and 
proposed strategies to counter it. This is followed by a conceptualization 
on how power asymmetry can be balanced for mutual benefits by drawing 
on consumer information (shopper demand) as a critical data set to enable 
suppliers to manage mutual dependence. Discussions and implications 
of the theoretical propositions and a developed model are made, and 
recommendations then presented.
1. Conceptual model
1.1. Power and supply chain relationships
The extant literature on relationships and power among suppliers and 
retailers depicts critical issues of interest to management researchers 
and practitioners of supply chain management and business research 
(Kähkönen, 2014; Wang et al., 2016; Maglaras et al., 2015). One stream 
contends that a supplier-retailer relationship is characterised with conflicts 
and opportunism where powerful retailers are using this relationship of 
mutual dependence to their advantage (Chung et al., 2011; Viitaharju & 
Lähdesmäki, 2012). They are believed to exploit these relationships by 
compelling suppliers to bear the costs of doing business with them, with 
attendant punitive actions such as delayed payments and unsold stock 
penalty costs (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007; Croson & Donohue, 2006). 
It is worth noting that the lack of a cooperative position that may allow a 
rebalancing of power asymmetry, has been articulated in leading supply 
chain and management journals over a long period as shown in Table 1 
below.
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Table 1 - Power imbalance inimical to the weaker partner–rebalancing power 
asymmetry imperative
Author Title Journal Findings
Kähkönen (2014) The influence of 
power position 
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Bowman, Froud, 
Johal, Leaver & 
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Yuan, (2017)
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Table 1 - continued
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to extract unfair 
concessions can 
come back to haunt 
a company if its 
position of power 
changes
Conversely, a significant number of researchers take the view that co-
operation and conflict co-exist between weaker and stronger partners 
within the supply chain (Belaya & Hanf, 2009; Collins & Burt, 2003). 
As such there are open communication channels where channel partners 
manage conflicts by undergoing continues balancing act (Terpend & 
Krause, 2015; Shen et al., 2017). The findings of publications outlined in 
Table 2. indicate that cooperation and coordination approaches to power 
dynamics in supplier-retailer relationships are not only popular with 
management and business researchers but also current (see for example 
Kumar et al., 2016: Terpend & Krause, 2015).
Table 2 - Co-operation and conflict co-exist – A balancing approach for win-win
Author Title Journal Findings
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Author Title Journal Findings
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Table 2 - continued
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Emerson (1962) noted that mutual dependence between the partners 
will influence their conduct and this will determine the direction of the 
relationship. Power dependence theory provides a theoretical justification 
for its usage by retailers for business relations with suppliers (Davis and 
Cobb, 2010). On the other hand, resource-dependent theory (rdt) highlights 
the resource-based view of the firm, which deals with managing inter- 
organisational relations by minimising the environmental uncertainty and 
dependencies (see, Davis & Cobb, 2010, p. 5). Given the limitations of 
existing paradigms about power-play in food supply chain relationships, 
perhaps, there is potential mutual leverage to be gained by combining 
the ethos of both power dependence and resource dependent theories to 
address the dynamic and complex process of supplier-retailer relationship. 
Approaching power relationship challenges in the food supply chain from 
a multi-theory perspective projects an integrated view of organisations, its 
internal and external environment and its interaction with power structures.
1.2. Power asymmetry and relationship management in the UK food supply 
chain: the case of Tesco
In the UK, it is generally acknowledged that food retailers like Tesco 
enjoy power asymmetry in their relationship with suppliers (Robson & 
Rawnsley, 2001; Bowman et al., 2013). As a result, major retailers’ control 
exchange relationships in the supply chain. This is especially in the case of 
fresh produce (fruit, vegetables and salads), which is predominantly supplied 
as retailer private (own) label (Hingley, 2005a). As fresh produce is short 
shelf life, suppliers need a stable and dependable buyer who can commit to 
a long- term relationship. Seeking stable long-term contracts to counteract 
perishability and seasonality issues overly exposes these suppliers to the 
dictate of retailers, who exploit their buying power to the disadvantage of 
suppliers (Hingley, 2005b; Kumar, 1996).
Ironically, in suppliers’ desire to control market vulnerability due to 
perishability challenges, they unintentionally create another dependency with 
retailers in terms of unfavourable terms of contracts (Pfeffer, 1981). Thus, 
suppliers’ trade sovereignty for support and create new sets of interdependencies 
with retailers. Such a commercial dilemma is akin to operating in a situation 
where there is a continuous struggle for survival (Davis & Cobb, 2010; Hillman 
et al., 2009) and chances of success are uncertain. In such an environment 
characterised by uncertainty, the powerful retailers control resources which are 
valuable, non-substitutable and rare (Hillman et al., 2009; Erturk et al., 2010). 
Therefore, access to these resources as highlighted by the resource dependence 
theory creates multiple dependencies and increases power imbalances.
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Another source of competitive advantage for retailers is their proximity 
to consumers. Tesco being one of the biggest retailers in the UK is one such 
example. They have access to 1.4 million-consumer demand information 
(loyalty card database) which is an important resource (Yu et al., 2001) 
and this closeness to the consumer gives retailers a powerful lever (control 
over mass consumer information) (Felgate & Fearne, 2105). Data and 
consequently insights can be used from the point of sales or through loyalty 
card data (Felgate et al., 2012; Burt & Sparks, 2003). Insights obtained from 
Tesco consumer data helps retailers mitigate the uncertainty of demand by 
effectively and efficiently employing resources across the chain. Conversely, 
this proximity of the retailer to the consumer has created a win-lose situation. 
Where, suppliers are obliged to the requirements of their powerful retail 
partner, such that they may manage their production/manufacturing facilities 
without necessarily knowing what consumers want.
Despite the skewed relationships that compel suppliers to comply with 
demands to take more cost-sharing, making them vulnerable, a profound 
point about this argument is its adverse effect on the entire supply chain 
sustainability. Indeed, red flags have been raised about the competitiveness 
and sustainability of the UK food chain (Taylor & Fearne, 2009) in which 
incomplete, skewed and one-sided channel leads to unsustainable practice (for 
example, short-term multi-buy offers on perishables). Here, uncertainty is 
driven by power asymmetry.
The conditions of this challenge further underscore this paper’s position 
to explore rebalancing power asymmetry within the UK food supply from 
a multi-organisational behaviour theory perspective – that is, combining 
the principles underlying power dependence and resource dependent 
theories. The prospects of such as approach are enhanced by the exponential 
growth of information technology and availability of consumer purchasing 
information (Davis & Cobb, 2010) that can be used for the mutual benefits 
of both actors in the food supply chain. Similarly, there is ample basis to 
envisage that approaching this supply chain problem from the combined 
viewpoints of power dependence and resource dependent theories could help 
address other problems.
Ettouzani et al. (2012) used case studies of seven major UK retailers and 
four major suppliers to study the issues around promotions. They identified 
thirty-two problemsand grouped them into eight themes. Uncertainty around 
consumer demand information was considered as the biggest problem faced 
by both of them reducing both efficiency (cost/waste) and effectiveness (sales 
growth) of promotions.
But the critical questions in this context are when and with whom this 
information should be used to improve the effectiveness of supply chain 
during promotions (Cannella & Ciancinnio, 2010)? Effective information 
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sharing at critical stages of promotional activity would potentially help 
suppliers make informed decisions that would improve power imbalances in 
their favour.
1.3. The power and relationship matrix
Having proposed and justified the need to draw on the tenets of resource 
dependence and power dependence theories to address power asymmetry 
between retailers and suppliers. what is now presented is the relationship 
matrix between the retailer’s power and supplier relationship management. 
This integrates different levels of retailer’s power with relevant relationship 
management styles and thus highlights different arrangements in a different 
context. The theoretical underpinning of resource dependence and power 
dependence theories serve as the context for this figure’s development.
To visualise the development of the collaborative environment, there is a 
strong need to first understand the relationship between levels of retailer’s power 
with their management style as it strongly affects the suppliers sourcing options. 
Synthesising different power matrices in the literature (Cox, 2004 a & b) and 
linking it with different relationship management styles along with suppliers’ 
management and selection, this research proposes the following (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 - Impact of retailer’s power and relationship style on the supplier’s 
management and selection
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Figure 1 shows the multiple combinations of supplier’s management based 
on different levels of retailer’s power and relationship styles. Exercising a 
relatively low level of power, the retailer will choose a supplier based purely 
on volume and manages an arm’s length relationship as shown in quadrant A 
(usually with tier two suppliers). Retailers will not work directly with them. 
An intermediatory like tier 1 supplier is involved to manage the relationship. 
On the other hand, retailers will exert more power when they choose suppliers 
based purely on short-term and focus is exclusively on cost as shown in 
quadrant B. This arm’s length approach is changed into a more collaborative 
style when they start developing the relationship with their suppliers, for 
example, through joint decision making and new product development. This 
arrangement is shown in supplier development as shown in quadrant C. 
Retailer’s influence starting to grow as seen from raw material to finished 
product through proactive adaption and innovation working closely with the 
suppliers along the chain. Focusing on this quadrant D where the relationship 
is collaborative and retailers power is high there is a strong need by both 
stakeholders to maintain equilibrium between retailer and supplier. In this way, 
retailers extend their market expertise to suppliers by co-opting and co-creating 
a product which is close to consumer needs and have a long-term focus.
Resource dependence theory suggests that firms try to maximise their 
power by altering their structures and behaviours to acquire external 
resources as these resources decrease their dependencies on others (Pfeffer, 
1981). One means of acquiring these valued resources is by co-opting with 
other organisations through social exchange. Co-optation adds stability to the 
inter-organisation relationships and serves to ameliorate the adverse effects 
of power asymmetry (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). In the context of a power 
imbalance scenario between small food suppliers and major retailers, that is 
characterised by inefficient promotions (Bogomolova et al., 2017) and poor 
food waste records, both parties should as a matter priority begin to create 
favourable conditions for co-optation (Marcos & Prior, 2017). Eventually, co-
optation will reduce the uncertainty of the business environment, which is an 
essential element for organisational survival.
1.4. Conceptual model
Based on the above research matrix, a conceptual model for balancing 
power asymmetry in the UK food supply chain with consumer demand 
information is presented (Figure 2). The literature revealed information 
asymmetry is one of the reasons for the power imbalance in the retailer-
supplier relationship and resource dependence theory suggest that better 
resource access to information will reduce uncertainty. However, due to the 
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proximityof an important source (consumer demand) for a retailer, a win-lose 
scenario, especially for a small food supplier is created. This resource can 
potentially change the balance of power by converting a win-lose into a win-
win situation for both as shown below. As consumer demand information is a 
resource controlled by retailers, sharing it with suppliers will improve power 
balance and mutual performance benefits for both partners.
Figure 2 - Conceptual model for balancing power asymmetry in the UK food supply 
chain with consumer demand information source
It is clear from the above figure no 2 that 9 different scenarios of win & 
lose situations (in relationship exchange) can be created when comparing 
buyer and suppliers value in the context of balancing power between 
them. However, information access and proximity can act as a balancing 
tool for this arrangement as highlighted in both resource dependence 
and power dependence theories. Consumer demand information is a key 
resource (resource dependence) as it provides useful insight about consumer 
behaviour, which not only improves supply chain efficiency but overall power 
balance(power dependence) as well.
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This is important in the sales promotions of food items especially fresh 
produce where the shelf life is short and the chances of food waste are 
high. A better-resourced (informed) supplier with the help of a cooperating 
buyer (retailer) will make informed decisions and effective execution, thus 
maintaining the overall value for both of them. Due to demand information 
asymmetry, the buyer (retailer) is in a win situation as compared to suppliers 
(as indicated by the dotted line). However, when the buyer owned demand 
information is shared with the supplier, the exchange relationship moves 
towards a win-win situation for both (as highlighted by the bold line) in 
Figure 2, thus creating a dynamic equilibrium. This shows that proximity to 
a scarce resource as if demand information can affect the overall balance of 
power and relationship for the benefits of all stakeholders. Thus, information 
asymmetry can be reduced and co-optation will increase when the right 
information resource (consumer demand information) is used for planning and 
execution between both the stakeholders.
2. Research prepositions
Based on the above framework and two organizational theories this paper 
makes the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Better access to resources through co-opting between small 
food supplier and retailer will improve power asymmetry
This proposition concerns the type of resources (a specific set of tools) 
which can help maintain a healthy and balanced exchange relationship 
between small food suppliers and their powerful food retailer buyer. 
Allocation of resources is a function of power (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977) and 
this becomes more critical when resources are either scarce or plentiful. 
Organizations endeavour to increase their power by gaining control over 
the flow of these resources. Consumer demand information is an important 
resource and its control by the focal organisation can create different 
dependencies (Provan et al., 1980). Different authors have highlighted 
multiple resources such as capital investment and human resources. These 
resources have been shown to improve supply chain relationships (Provan et 
al., 1980; Li & Lin, 2006). However, learning through non-competitive and 
cooperative manner is the most suitable resource as it helps firms to absorb, 
and transfer knowledge through collaborative arrangements and creates a 
win-win condition for collaboration (Tsang, 1999; Fawcett et al., 2012). It 
also helps firms to share risks and cost in a more complementary way, thus 
enhancing each other’s skill and position in the market (Tsang, 1999).
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Information as a resource in a supply chain network has been discussed 
at two different levels (strategic and tactical). Consumer demand 
information has been classified as strategic because it helps interpret 
consumer behaviour to make an informed decision in volatile and 
uncertain markets. This critical for small food suppliers as their products 
have limited shelf life and resources to manage any uncertainty. However, 
opportunistic behaviour and divergent objectives have caused information 
asymmetry in the supply chain as information disclosures can be perceived 
as a loss of power for focal organisations (Li & Lin, 2006). Therefore, a 
better strategy is needed to overcome the barriers to information sharing 
and encouraging better supply chain relationships through knowledge and 
learning (Kembro & Näslund, 2014).
Resource dependence theory (rdt) is considered suitable in understanding 
the barriers and enablers of information sharing in supply chain networks, 
as it provides the resource-based view of the firm (Kembro & Näslund, 
2014). Better information sharing has been shown to reduce environmental 
uncertainty (Li & Lin, 2006), which is essential for reducing dependencies 
between suppliers and retailers. According to Benton & Maloni (2005) failure 
to share information is considered a barrier to using power as a potential tool 
in supply chain integration for higher performance (Benton & Maloni, 2005). 
Therefore, the paper further proposes that:
Proposition 2: Sharing consumer demand information between small food 
suppliers and their retail partners can act as a balancing tool for reducing 
power asymmetry between suppliers and buyers for mutual exchange 
relationship benefits
Conclusions
The significance of power asymmetry in food supply chain relationships 
management cannot be overemphasised. However, there is disagreement 
in the extant literature regarding how power imbalance ought to be 
approached for the benefit of partners in the exchange channel. Despite 
the strong theoretical foundations of the existing schools of thought on 
power dynamics in supply chain management, they appear insufficient 
to address the risk exposure of small food suppliers and to guarantee 
the success of the entire supply chain and its long-term sustainability. 
By contrast, this paper draws on organisational behaviour theories 
(power dependence and resource dependence theory) to contributes to 
the discourse around power and dependence by suggesting that, the use 
of consumer demand information (shopper demand), as a critical set 
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of tactics, can be utilised to redress power asymmetry with powerful 
retailers for mutual benefits.
The conceptual model suggests that on the contrary, the often-imbalanced 
vertical food supply chains also adversely affect both partners, particularly 
in terms of promotions efficiency and food waste. This calls for a change 
of approach to value addition through interaction and co-operation to create 
favourable conditions for co-optation between the powerful retailers and 
small food suppliers. In this way, consumer demand information sharing 
is possible and thereby serve as the critical set of tools to improve power 
balance for a mutually beneficial performance.
Important strategic and practical implications for stakeholders within the 
food industry emerge from the analysis in this paper. Reducing uncertainty 
by a better understanding of supply chain stakeholder’s behaviour will 
improve coordination. Waste and efficiency issues are key challenges faced 
by the food sector and using the information as a tool to manage them is 
gaining traction. The success of a firm is measured by the management of 
a complex web of relationships, which leads to simulated learning through 
the integration of information and its effective use. The emergence of big 
data has changed the way organisations manage their dependencies with 
other firms and the business environment. High level of information sharing 
could improve the performance and sustainability of the food supply chain. 
Sustainability is another important key dimension to this collaboration, better 
cooption and power equilibrium will result into better.
Contribution to theory
No single theory can adequately explain the complex business environment 
of the food supply chain due to the impact of multiple factors. Integration 
of resource theory and power dependence theory provides a more robust 
explanation of current issues of power balance and relationship management 
(Takashima & Kim, 2016). It shows how one aspect of a theory (power 
imbalance) provides a better explanation for another phenomenon 
(relationship management) in a given set of conditions with a specific context 
of the food industry (Hingley, 2005b). This integration also adds a novel 
resource (consumer demand) into the mix of relationships, power and their 
overall management.
To build more effective food supply chain relationships, improved 
information sharing should also be accompanied by shared objectives 
between the channel partners. This will help in developing a positive power 
base where each partner will be conscious of its available resources and 
manage them for the benefit of the whole supply chain. Thus, relational 
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use of power by the dominant firm will strengthen effective integration 
and improve suppliers’ satisfaction towards creating mutual trust and 
coordination.
Future research direction and limitations
This research directs towards a novel direction of information used for 
the sake of power balance and better relationship management. This is 
especially true in today’s environment of big data and consumer insights. All 
stakeholders are increasingly becoming aware of its use for their business 
and long-term prospects. This is especially true for the food industry where 
profit margins are low and competition is fierce. Consumer insights obtained 
through information sharing can play a significant role in shaping tomorrow’s 
relations and power structures.
Information extraction and application has to be done keeping in view 
the available resources with stakeholders as using and generating consumer 
insights from big data needs extensive training. This becomes critical 
for small food suppliers as they are already short of resources and need 
retailers to help in generating useful decisions making for information 
sources.
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